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THE DILEMMA OF DIFFERENCE: 
RACE AS A SENTENCING 
FACTOR 
PALCIDO G. GOMEZ· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
[T]he dilemma of difference: by taking another 
person's difference into account ... you risk reit-
erating the significance of that difference and, po-
tentially, its stigma and stereotyping conse-
quences. But if you do not take another person's 
difference into account - in a world that has made 
that difference matter - you may also recreate and 
reestablish both the difference and its negative 
implications. l 
This paper· addresses the dilemma of difference, specifically 
that associated with the race of an offender, as it affects criminal 
sentencing under the federal sentencing guidelines mandated by 
the Sentencing Reform Act. 2 I argue that federal judges should 
continue to consider an offender's race as a mitigating factor3 
• Assistant Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern Univer-
sity; B.A., 1975, M.A., 1976, Adams State College; J.D., 1985, University of New Mexico 
School of Law; LL.M., 1988, Yale Law School. I wish to thank my family, friends, and 
colleagues for their support and comments. 
1. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, 
101 HARv. L. REV. 10, 71 (1987). 
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988). One member of the 
Sentencing Commission called the guidelines "probably the most significant change in 
the criminal law in this century." Symposium: Equality Versus Discretion in Sentenc-
ing, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1813, 1830 (1989)(statement of Commissioner Stephen Breyer). 
3. Because ours is a history saturated with racial prejudice, I am uncomfortable sug-
gesting that race be considered at sentencing as an aggravating factor. However, the Su-
preme Court recently upheld a Wisconsin statute that authorizes enhanced sentences for 
racially motivated crimes. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). In an opin-
ion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, a unanimous court considered the enhanced 
sentences justified in light of the "greater individual and societal harm" racially moti-
357 
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when imposing criminal sentences, despite language to the con-
trary in the guidelines and the enabling statute.· 
The sentencing decision is the "symbolic keystone of the 
criminal justice system."1i It involves two competing concepts, 
both basic to the American legal tradition. First, we embrace the 
notion that sentences should fit the crime; two persons,. con-
victed of the same or similar crimes, should receive similar pun-
ishment. On the other hand, we believe that punishment should 
be individualized; that is, courts should structure individual 
sentences to best meet the goals of the criminal law and the 
needs of society.s The history of sentencing theory is an attempt 
to balance these two sometimes conflicting demands. 7 
The way we carry out that balancing is critical. The sen-
tencing decision often entails stripping a person of those things 
our society values most, life and liberty.s Moreover, sentencing 
decisions are uniquely visible. The general public may have little 
familiarity with most of the mechanisms of the criminal justice 
system.& But they do understand sentences: Boesky got three 
years; Nixon never served a day; Hurricane Carter did nineteen 
years. 10 These sentences, and opinions about them, shape public 
assessment concerning the legitimacy of our criminal justice 
systemY 
Concern for that legitimacy gave impetus to the sentencing 
reform movement. Among the factors sparking reform was wide-
spread belief that the sentencing decision was tarnished by ra-
vated crimes inflict. [d. at 2201. 
4. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 5H1.l0, at 326 (1993)[hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL]; 28 U.S.C. 
§ 994(d)(1l) (1988). 
5. 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 1 (Alfred Blumstein et al. 
eds., 1983)[hereinafter RESEARCH ON SENTENCING]. 
6. [d. 
7. D. A. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING 6-14 (2d ed. 1979) (describing the evolu-
tion of these concepts and its effect on sentencing policy). 
8. }{~;SEARCH ON SENTENCING, supra note 5, at 1. 
9. See generally MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING, THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSE-
CUTORS .• JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1978). 
10. Judge Drops Murder Charges in the Hurricane Carter Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
27, 1988, § 1, at 8. 
11. Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evalua-
tion of the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 
783, 783 (1981). 
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cial discrimination.12 In 1979, blacks accounted for 10.1 % of this 
country's adult male population, yet occupied 48% of the beds 
in our state prisons.13 This disparity, when publicized, brought 
charges of racial discrimination. 14 The sociological studies and 
the literature that followed have yet to answer the charges 
definitively. III 
12. RESEARCH ON SENTENCING, supra note 5, at 3; JOAN PETERSILIA & SUSAN TURNER. 
GUIDELINE-BASED JUSTICE. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR RACIAL MINORITIES 1 (1985); Sympo-
sium: Equality Versus Discretion in Sentencing, supra note 2, at 1815-16 (presentation 
of Commissioner Ilene Nagel). Other factors contributing to the sentencing reform move-
ment were prison uprisings, concern about the rights of offenders, control of post-sen-
tencing discretion, accountability, disillusionment with rehabilitation, and crime contro!' 
RESE'>'RCH ON SENTENCING, supra note 5, at 3. 
13. RESEARCH ON SENTENCING, supra note 5, at 13; see also PETERSILIA & TURNER. 
supra note 12, at v. 
14. PETERSILIA & TURNER. supra note 12, at 1; RESEARCH ON SENTENCING, supra note 
5, at 3. Charges of racial discrimination within the criminal justice system are not new, 
nor are they confined to the sentencing process. In 1883 Frederick Douglas spoke on the 
subject: "Justice is often painted with bandaged eyes, she is described in forensic elo-
quence as utterly blind to wealth or poverty, high or low, white or black, but a mask of 
iron however thick could never blind American justice when a black man happens to be 
on tria!''' Thomas M. Uhlman, The Impact of Defendant Race in Trial-Court Sanction-
ing Decisions in PUBLIC LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 19, 20 (John A. Gardiner ed., 
1977)(quoting Frederick Douglas)(footnote omitted). 
15. Sociologists have debated since the late 1920s whether the disparities in sentenc-
ing are race-related. Uhlman, supra note 14, at 19. Dale Dannefer & Russell K. Schutt, 
Race and Juvenile Justice Processing in Court and Police Agencies, 87 AMER. J. OF SOC. 
1113, 1113-14 (1982)(reviewing the literature concering this debate); see also James D. 
Unnever et a!., Race Differences in Criminal Sentencing, 21 THE SOC. Q. 197, 204-05 
(1980); Steven Klepper et a!., Discrimination in the Criminal Justice System: A Critical 
Appraisal of the Literature, in 2 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 55, 
94-5 (Alfred Blumstein et a!. eds., 1983)(contains a chart of previous studies exhibiting 
the differences of opinion and some of the complexities involved in addressing the prob-
lem through sociological inquiries). 
Uhlman, supra note 14, at 40 (concluding from a study of a sample of over 43,000 
cases in a metropolitan area that there was significant discrimination in the sentencing 
process); Cassia Spohn et a!., The Effect of Race on Sentencing: A Re-examination of an 
Unsettled Question, 16 LAW AND SOC'Y REV. 71 (1981-82)(using the same sample, they 
controlled for prior criminal record, and divided the sentencing decision into two compo-
nents: (1) the decision whether or not to incarcerate, and (2) the length of the sentence. 
They found that although blacks were more likely than whites to be incarcerated, race 
had no direct effect on the severity of a sentence. They also found evidence of discrimi-
nation based on wealth). 
James L. Gibson, Race as a Determinant of Criminal Sentences: A Methodological 
Critique and A Case Study, 12 LAW AND SOC'y REV. 455 (1978)(concluding that discrimi-
nation was not a factor on an institutional level, yet finding that the discriminatory atti-
tudes of individual judges made race a significant factor in some sentencing decisions). 
James J. Collins, The Disposition of Adult Arrests: Legal and Extralegal Determi-
nants of Outcomes, in FROM Boy TO MAN. FROM DELINQUENCY TO CRIME 68,69-70 (Mar-
vin E. Wolfgang et al. eds., 1988)(Collins found that "nonwhites were less likely to have 
arrest charges dismissed ... [aJnd more likely to be incarcerated." There was also evi-
3
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Both Congress and the drafters of the federal sentencing 
guidelines were sensitive to the studies and reports, as well as 
public sentiment, suggesting that racial bias infected many sen-
tencing decisions. However, the Sentencing Commission dis-
torted Congress' sensitivity. Following what it interpreted as a 
Congressional mandate,16 the Commission declared simply that 
race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic sta-
tus "are not relevant in the determination of a sentence."17 The 
enabling statute and legislative history reveal that Congress an-
ticipated a more sophisticated approach to this complex prob-
lem.18 Congress recognized that race may be a relevant factor in 
the sentencing decision: but under what circumstances?19 
This article suggests two classes of cases where a judge 
should consider the offender's race as a mitigating factor during 
the sentencing decision: first, where cultural uniqueness peculiar 
to the offender's race exists and is causally related to the crime; 
second, where racial discrimination has tainted the criminal pro-
cess. I address two distinct situations in this second category: 
first, where it is likely that racial discrimination has occurred at 
previous stages of the criminal process; second, where prior ra-
cial bias has made it likely that the defendant's criminal history 
category inaccurately magnifies the seriousness of a defendant's 
crime or the likelihood that the defendant will commit further 
dence that nonwhite repeat offenders were treated more severely that whites with similar 
records. His study also found a correlation between racial discrimination and the formal-
ity of the procedures. Less formal procedures encouraged more discretion and, as a re-
sult, more racial discrimination}. 
Kleck, supra note 11, at 799 (Kleck concluded that there exists no "general or wide-
spread overt discrimination against black defendants .... " However, he found evidence 
of racial discrimination for specific jurisdictions, judges, and crime types). 
16. Congress instructed the Sentencing Commission to "assure that the guidelines 
and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed, and 
socioeconomic status of offenders." 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(l1} (1988). 
17. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 4, § 5H1.10, at 326. 
18. Congress required that the guidelines exhibit more than simple neutrality to-
wards an offender's race. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3220, 3354 n.409 [hereinafter S. Rep. No. 225). The report reads: "The 
requirement of [sentencing) neutrality with regard to such factors [race, sex, national 
origin, creed, and socio-economic status) is not a requirement of blindness." 
19. The Senate Report gives limited guidance: "In sentencing a person to imprison-
ment it would be appropriate to have a judge consider, for example, recommending 
placement in an institution equipped to accommodate the religious dietary laws followed 
by the defendant, or an institution housing prisoners of the defendant's sex." S. Rep. No. 
225, supra note 18, at 3354 n.409. 
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crimes.20 The "cultural uniqueness" cases call for the sentencing 
judge to consider alternative models of criminal justice and the 
effects of an offender's culture on his culpability. Both types of 
cases urge judges not to "freeze in place the past consequences 
of differences."21 This approach recognizes that "neutral means 
might not produce neutral results, given historic practices and 
social arrangements that have not been neutral. "22 
II. CULTURALLY UNIQUE CASES 
The idea is not popular today: two people who committed 
the same crime receive disparate sentences because they happen 
to come from different cultural backgrounds. And yet, I suggest, 
we must sometimes do just that. My argument is rooted in: (i) 
the role of cultural diversity in our system of politics, and (ii) 
classic liberal theories of culpability.23 
Punishment is only justified when (1) the action is morally 
condemnable, and (2) the actor is culpable.24 These determina-
tions require an assessment of both the act and the individual 
actor. These, in turn, require an inquiry into whether, and to 
what extent, an act is morally condemnable; different cultures 
may view the same act differently. The theory of culpability al-
lows the criminal justice system to punish only those offenders 
who meet a standard of blameworthiness. 211 A person is not re-
20. The second situation may arise when federal courts, sentencing pursuant to the 
federal sentencing guidelines, consider departures under § 4A1.3, Adequacy of Criminal 
History Category. I track the language of this policy statement. GUIDELINES MANUAL, 
supra note 4, § 4A1.3, at 277-79. 
21. Minow, supra note I, at 12. 
22. Id. at 22. 
23. See generally Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Crimi-
nal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation, 3 LAW & INEQUAL-
ITY: A JOURNAL OF THEORY AND PRACTICE 9 (1985). 
24. David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 388 
(1976). Judge Bazelon adds a third prerequisite which I consider in an analysis of the 
actor's culpability: that "society's own conduct in relation to the actor entitles it to sit in 
condemnation of him with respect to the condemnable act." That is, if society is respon-
sible for or has condoned the defendant's act, society may not condemn him. Id. 
25. H.LA HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 35-40 (1968); see also STANTON 
WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE COLLAR OFFENDERS 
(1988). Wheeler and his colleagues suggest that the offender's blameworthiness is one of 
the major factors which society uses to measure the seriousness of a criminal act. Id. at 
53, 81-123. 
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sponsible for a crime unless the criminal action was voluntary.28 
If pressures beyond the actor's control make his act less than 
voluntary, the offender is not culpable and his action may be 
mi tiga ted. 27 
Recent reform efforts have added a third emphasis: equal 
treatment. 28 Using disparity as their battle cry, guideline de-
fenders are close to burying the rehabilitative model of criminal 
justice. Disparity, these proponents say, is a result of an out-
dated emphasis on the individual offender,29 an approach that 
encourages "unfettered judicial discretion."30 Indeterminate sen-
tencing, required by a rehabilitation-orientated penology,31 fo-
cuses on an assessment of the individual offender's "amenability 
26.Id. 
27. Delgado, supra note 23, at 17. If voluntary choice is eliminated or diminished, 
the offender's action may be mitigated. Delgado refers to this concept as the "voluntary 
choice model." Id. See also Bazelon, supra note 24, at 389. Judge Bazelon mentions sev-
eral examples, taken from his years on the bench, where the actor's free choice was illu-
sory. See United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 1044 (1972). Alexander involved an economically deprived, oppressed African-
American youth, Benjamin Murdock, who shot and killed a marine. The marine had 
called Mr. Murdock a "black bastard" after taunting him and two friends with other 
. racial remarks. Id. at 929, 957. There was psychiatric testimony that Murdock's "emo-
tional difficulties were closely tied to his sense of racial oppression" and that shooting 
the marine was not voluntary. Id. at 957. See also Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979, 
(D.C. Cir. 1964) (before JJ. Miller, Burger, and Wright)(involving a man who burglarized 
a liquor store so that he would be able to provide medical care for his pregnant wife); 
United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 
(1973)(rejecting the necessity defense of a drug addict convicted of possession of heroin); 
Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (U.S. App. D.C. 1966) (en banc)(concerning a 
chronic alcoholic convicted of being "drunk and intoxicated" on a Washington, D.C. 
street); United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 229 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013 
(1975)(Barker was one of the Watergate defendants whom Judge Bazelon described in 
his concurring opinion as "super-patriotic citizen[sj steeped in cold war ideology."). 
28. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 4, at 2; see also Ilene H. Nagel, Testimony 
before the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice 1 (July 23, 
1987). Ms. Nagel calls the elimination of disparity a "core motive" justifying the guide-
lines. Id. 
29. S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 18, at 3221. 
30. The phrase is generally attributed to Judge Marvin E. Frankel who is recognized 
as the father of sentencing reform. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION. SUPPLEMEN-
TARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS. June 18, 
1987. During the Marx Lectures at the University of Cincinnati Law School November 3-
5, 1971, Frankel proposed that a National Sentencing Commission oversee sentencing 
policy and rules. The lectures were subsequently published. Marvin E. Frankel, Lawless-
ness in Sentencing, 41 U. CINN. L. REV. 1 (1972). Frankel's book, CRIMINAL SENTENCES. 
LAW WITHOUT ORDER is an expanded version of the Marx Lectures. MARVIN E. FRANKEL. 
CRIMINAL SENTENCES. LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973). 
31. RESEARCH ON SENTENCING, supra note 5, at 62. 
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to treatment."32 When judges focus on individual offenders 
rather than the offender's actions, disparate sentences are 
inevitable.33 
Many of the same critics of flexible sentencing also charge 
that it can reflect and accentuate racial bias.34 That there are 
more minorities, sentenced to longer terms, serving a longer por-
tion of their sentences, than their proportion in the population 
would indicate is not open to serious question.311 Still, sociologi-
cal studies do not agree why this is SO.36 The studies are plagued 
by methodological problems,37 including serious flaws in the se-
lection process.38 
Scholars generally do agree, however, that it is an oversim-
plification to claim a direct link between race and sentencing;39 
the key determinants in the latter are the seriousness of the of-
fense and the offender's prior record."o Nevertheless, racial dis-
crimination may have a substantial impact on sentencing deci-
sions in specific regions and jurisdictions,n stemming from 
32.Id. 
33. See generally FRANKEL, supra note 30, at 3-11. Further, reformers argue, indi-
vidualized sentences do not necessarily enhance the prospects for rehabilitation. PETER-
SILIA & TURNER. supra note 12, at I, n.1. 
34. JOAN PETERSILIA. RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM. 1 (U.S. 
Dep't of Justice, Rand Corp.) (1983). 
35. Id. at 63; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
36. See supra note 15. 
37. See generally Gibson, supra note 15. Commissioner Nagel argues that Congress 
legislated a method for measuring disparity. The method is unlike those in most socio-
logical studies. Nagel, Testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee 
on Criminal Justice, supra note 28, at 6-7. 
38. Klepper et aI., supra note 15, at 63-65. Klepper and his colleagues argue that, 
because of discrimination at the initial stages of the criminal process, the crimes that 
reach successive stages "are not representative of the broader population of crimes." Id. 
at 64. "[B]iases induced by sample selection might mask the true extent of [any] dis-
crimination. . . even create the illusion of reverse discrimination at the sentencing stage 
.... " Id. at 65. At least one study claims that patterns of greater leniency toward black 
defendants are not uncommon. Kleck, supra note 11, at 799-800. 
39. Uhlman, supra note 14, at 27. Uhlman indicates that researchers now believe 
that to suggest a "direct link between race and sentencing is an inaccurate oversimplifi-
cation of a multifaceted relationship." Id. 
40. RESEARCH ON SENTENCING, supra note 5, at 11. Among the other important fac-
tors is whether or not there has been a plea agreement. Id. at 18. 
41. Id. at 15-16. Defendants are subject to more racial discrimination in rural courts. 
Apparently, the more bureaucratic the court, the less attention it pays to offender char-
acteristics. Margaret P. Jendrik, Sentence Length: Interactions with Race and Court, 12 
J. CRIM. JUST. 567, 569-70 (1984). 
7
Gomez: Race As a Sentencing Factor
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
364 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:357 
specific types of crimes,'2 and in isolated decisions involving in-
dividual participants,'3 especially parole decisions.'4 Differences 
in behavior among races may also play a role in the dispropor-
tionate number of minorities serving prison terms, especially 
when these behavioral differences interact with other factors 
such as the "patterns in the deployment of law enforcement re-
sources and the differing rates of apprehension, conviction, and 
imprisonment" of racial minority offenders.4!1 
Proponents of sentencing guidelines urged that guideline 
sentencing would address the problem of racial discrimination in 
the sentencing process.46 Others, however, fear that. guidelines 
will exacerbate racial tension.47 Most studies indicate that fac-
tors which correlate with recidivism also correlate with race.'8 
The experience in Minnesota is illustrative. As a general princi-
ple, the Minnesota guidelines are indifferent to an offender's 
race.'9 Judges may not consider race in a decision to depart. llo 
42. Nagel, Testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, supra note 28, at 11-19. Commissioner Nagel maintains that race, sex, 
and region are statistically significant factors in both the in/out decision and sentence 
length of bank robbers; race is a significant factor in the sentence length of bank embez-
zlers; sex, race, ethnicity, age, and region significantly effect the in/out decision when 
heroin distribution and importation is the crime. Id. at 6-19. Petersilia suggests de facto 
discrimination against Afro-Americans and Hispanics charged with property crimes. 
PETERSILIA, supra note 12, at 94; but see Stevens H. Clarke & Gary G. Koch, The Influ-
ence of Income and Other Factors on Whether Criminal Defendants go to Prison, 11 
LAW AND SOc'v REV. 57 (1976). 
Studies indicate that race is a significant factor in death penalty cases. RESEARCH ON 
SENTENCING, supra note 5, at 16; see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 321-44 
(Brennen, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 920 (1987). 
43. RESEARCH ON SENTENCING, supra note 5, at 13. 
44. Many view whites as better candidates for rehabilitation. PETERSILIA, supra note 
34, at 97. 
45. RESEARCH ON SENTENCING, supra note 5, at 13. 
46. See, e.g., William W. Wilkins, Jr., Statement at the United States Sentencing 
Commissio~ Hearing 108 (Atlanta, Georgia, Oct. 29, 1986)(Wilkins claims that 
"[elverybody will be fed from the same spoon, be they black or white, rich or poor."). 
47. PETERSILIA & TURNER, supra note 12, at vii. Many early proponents of guideline 
sentencing had a change of heart when they realized that guidelines would not effectively 
address the problem of racially disparate sentences. Gerald W. Heaney, Reuisiting Dis-
parity: Debating Guidelines Sentencing, 29 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 771, 779 (1992). 
48. PETERSILIA & TURNER, supra note 12, at 25. Petersilia & Turner argue that using 
these factors is "the functional equivalent of using race itself." Id. at vi. They demon-
strate that eliminating the factors that correlate with race will decrease the accuracy of 
predicting recidivism by only 5%-12%. Id. at 25-26. 
49. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMSSION, I, (1982); see also Charles A. 
Moore & Terance D. Miethe, Regulated and Unregulated Sentencing Decisions: An 
Analysis of First- Year Practices under Minnesota's Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 20 
8
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Yet the minority prison population has increased significantly 
since the Minnesota legislature imposed guidelines. III Although 
we lack long term studies addressing the correlation between 
guidelines and minority prison population, it appears doubtful 
that guidelines can address racial discrimination in sentencing; 
they may even compound the problem without curbing recidi-
vism.1I2 In fact, preliminary numbers indicate the guidelines have 
not succeeded in curbing racial bias in the criminal justice sys-
tem.1I3 Rather, the guidelines themselves may make discrimina-
tion based on race inevitable.1I4 
The guidelines embody the traditional sentencing concepts 
of individualized sentences and uniformity in sentencing. How-
ever, they give greater weight to the latter.1I11 In this respect, they 
forsake the personalized approach to sentencing developed by 
the common lawll6 with little corresponding gain in fairness. The 
LAW AND SOc'y REV. 253, 256 (1980). 
50. Id. at 257. 
51. PETERSILIA, supra note 34, at 25. 
52.Id. 
53. See Heaney, supra note 47, at 779-82, 790-92. Judge Heaney, the Senior Judge 
for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, uses early Commission statistics to show that 
guideline sentencing has increased racial disparity especially among Hispanics· and Black 
males between the ages of 18 and 35. Id.; but see William W. Wilkins, A Response to 
Judge Heaney, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 795. Judge Wilkins is a Circuit Judge for the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals and the Chair of the Sentencing Commission. Judge Wilkins 
claims the pace immigration cases move through the system accounts for the 200% in-
crease in the number of Hispanics sentenced under the guidelines during 1989. [d. at 
800. 
54. See Heaney, supra note 47, at 791-92. 
55. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 4, at 2-4. 
56. United States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362, 1365 «9th Cir. (1985); ct. McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304 (Brennen, J., dissenting) reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 920 
(1987)(quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304. "Any exclusion of the 
compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind 
that are relevant to the sen tencer's decision would fail to treat all persons as uniquely 
individual human beings.")(quotation marks omitted); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 
241, 245-47, reh'g denied, 337 U.S. 961 (1948), and reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 841 
(1948)("Highly relevant - if not essential - to la judge's) selection of an appropriate sen-
tence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life 
and characteristics .... "); WHEELER ET AL .. supra note 25, at 44 n.11 ("The knowledge of 
the life of a man, his background and his family, is the only proper basis for the determi-
nation as to his treatment. The sentencing judge in the federal court has the tools with 
which to acquire that information. Failure to make full use of those tools cannot be 
justified."). See also Joseph E. deGenova, Testimony before the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission 319 (Washington, D.C., Dec. 3, 1986). Mr. deGenova, who was the 
United States Attorney and a member of the Sentencing Commission for the Superior 
Court of the District of Columbia, stated that the guideline system would force judges to 
9
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inequities of this trade-off appear most clearly in cases involving 
a culturally diverse defendant. 
Whether or not an act is viewed as criminal is not univer-
sal.1i7 Each community evaluates its constituents' actions against 
a backdrop that reflects that community's world view. In a na-
tion that celebrates cultural diversity, the criminal justice sys-
tem must take account of cultural differences; an individualistic 
model that focuses exclusively on the actor's deeds is not suffi-
cient. While the actor's deeds are always relevant in assessing 
wrongfulness, we must also inquire into the "social expectations 
of others for what the actor should have done. "1i8 In this ap-
proach the social obligations that accompany the actor's role in 
the particular cultural society take on added significance.1i9 
"give up some individuality [and) the kind of 'benign disparity,' as some people would 
call it, in order to achieve the greater good for the greater number." Id. But see S. Rep. 
No. 225, supra note 18, at 3235 (suggesting that the guidelines will actually enhance 
individualization of sentences). 
57. The group conflict model suggests one reason why different societies may have 
divergent views concerning what acts are criminal. See GEORGE B. VOLD. THEORETICAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 203-19 (1953). A democratic society is the product of the constant struggle 
for power among antagonistic groups. The victorious groups, through legislative majori-
ties, are able to define criminal action. Thus, what is criminal can be arbitrary depending 
upon which group has power at any given time. [d. at 208-09. And, significantly, power is 
related to race. Allen E. Liska & Mark Tausig, Theoretical Interpretations of Social 
Class and Racial Differentials in Legal Decision-Making for Juueniles, 20 Soc. Q. 197, 
204 (1979). 
Of course, there are societal principles that discourage abrupt changes in the defini-
tion of criminal action. Within democratic societies the definitions of criminal action 
tend to evolve rather than change suddenly. However, distinct societies may have dissim-
ilar principles. And, as a result, disparate definitions of criminal action may evolve. Also, 
non-democratic societies may experience abrupt changes in definitions of criminal action. 
Consequently, among the many peoples of the world, it is not unusual to discover that 
the same act is illegal in one culture and ordained by another. 
58. V. Lee Hamilton & Joseph Sanders, Uniuersals in Judging Wrongdoing: Japa-
nese and Americans Compared, 48 AMER. Soc. REV. 199, 199-200 (1983)(emphasis in 
original). 
59. [d. at 199. These role-based social expectations "can serve both as direct inputs 
to judging wrongdoing and as normative contexts within which action will be judged." Id. 
at 200. 
A universal model also shifts the focus of sanctions from a retributive emphasis to 
an approach that incorporates the benefits of punishment based on restitution. A crimi-
nal justice system that focuses on an actor's deeds views an offender as the sole cause of 
a particular crime. Accordingly, the cure lies in sanctioning the offender. On the other 
hand, a criminal justice system that does not focus on the actor's deeds, but rather views 
the actors relationally, places a restitutive function on sanctions. Offenders are not 
merely "perpetrators," to be sentenced in terms of their deeds alone, but rather persons 
"embedded in a series of role obligations and structural constraints." Punishment, there-
fore, is restitutive, "focused on restoring social bonds" destroyed or diminished by the 
10
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Blameworthiness is related to culture.6o Whether or not a 
culture condones a particular action may increase or decrease 
the actor's culpability. Likewise, an offender's culture may add 
to the pressures that make it difficult for him to comply with a 
societal norm.61 In situations like these, a sentencing judge 
should consider an offender's race and cultural background. We 
have long recognized that" [j]udges develop. . . expanded con-
cepts of harm and blameworthiness that enable them to consider 
variables and circumstances not built into the statute law or the 
common law, but that are close cousins of the underlying values 
built into that law."62 Sentencing judges thus occupy a unique 
role in our society's criminal justice system. We allow, even re-
quire, judges to extend technical legal requirements concerning 
the degree of culpability and use standards broader than those 
of the courtroom.63 An offender's race is a variable that sentenc-
ing judges should incorporate into those broad standards. Con-
sider the following story. 
In January, 1985, Ms. Fumiko Kimura left her home in sub-
urban Los Angeles and travelled by bus to the beach in Santa 
Monica, California.64 With her were her daughter Yuri, six 
months old, and her son Kazutaka, four years old. At the shore, 
Ms. Kimura took Yuri in her arms, grabbed Kazutaka tightly by 
his hand, and walked into the sea. Ms. Kimura had recently 
learned that her husband was keeping a mistress. To rid herself 
of the shame and to rescue her children from humiliation, Ms. 
Kimura attempted oyako-shinju - parent-child suicide. Ms. 
Kimura was rescued by passers by, but her two children 
drowned. The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged 
Ms. Kimura with first degree murder. Four thousand members 
offender's actions. Id. at 208; see also John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure, or 
a Third "Model" of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L. J. 359 (1970). 
60. Traditionally, sentencing courts undertake an individual assessment of the de-
fendant's culpability. United States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1985); see also 
supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
61. See supra note 27. 
62. WHEELER ET AL., supra note 25, at 124. 
63. Id. at 87-97. 
64. This story is adapted from Spencer Sherman, Legal Clash of Cultures, NAT'L 
L.J., Aug. 5, 1985, at 1. See also Teresa Wantabe, Japanese Mom Who Drowned Her 
Kids is Freed, San Jose Mercury News, California News Section at IG; Myrna Oliver, 
Immigrant Crimes Cultural Defense - A Legal Tactic, LA TIMES, July 15, 1988, at 1. 
(Ms. Oliver presents a half dozen analogous cases which present similar sentencing 
issues). 
11
Gomez: Race As a Sentencing Factor
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
368 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:357 
of the Japanese community in Los Angeles spoke in Ms. 
Kimura's behalf. They signed and delivered a petition to the 
District Attorney explaining that Ms. Kimura's behavior would 
not be considered murder in Japan. According to the petitioners, 
"the roots of her Japanese culture'! directed Ms. Kimura's acts. 
Prosecutors in her native land would have sought a conviction of 
involuntary manslaughter, nothing more. If convicted in Japan, 
they claimed, Ms. Kimura would probably face "a light, sus-
pended'sentence, probation, and supervised rehabilitation." 
Assume that Ms. Kimura pled guilty, in a federal court, to 
two counts of voluntary manslaughter.61i Under the federal sen-
tencing guidelines, Ms. Kimura's total offense level is twenty-
seven.66 She is in criminal history category 1.67 Thus, the range 
of her sentence is seventy to eighty-seven months.6s The sen-
tencing judge should be free to consider Ms. Kimura's race and 
Japanese culture as a mitigating factor and depart from the 
range prescribed by the guidelines.69 The judge should articulate 
65. Apparently, Ms. Kimura had the requisite intent and premeditation to be 
charged with first or second degree murder. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988). 
The California Deputy ~istrict Attorney assigned to the actual case appeared to be 
aware of the dilemma it presented. However, she rejected the defense attorney's sugges-
tion that the charge be bargained down to involuntary manslaughter. "You're treading 
on such shaky ground when you decide something based on a cultural thing," she argued, 
"because our society is made up of so many different cultures. . . but they are living in 
our country and people have to abide by our laws ... [v)oluntary manslaughter is as low 
as we'll go." Sherman, supra note 64, at 26. 
66. The base offense level for involuntary manslaughter is 25. GUIDELINES MANUAL, 
supra note 4, § 2A1.3, at 36. The ages of the victims make them unusually vulnerable 
and victim-related adjustments increase the base level by two. [d. § 3A1.1, at 239. In 
Mrs. Kimura's situation, there are no adjustments for role in the offense or obstruction. 
[d. §§ 3B1.1-3B1.3, at 243-46; § 3C1.1, at 247. Because Ms. Kimura pled guilty to two 
counts of voluntary manslaughter, the guidelines add two levels to the offense level. [d. 
§§ 301.1-301.5, at 252-62. Assume Ms. Kimura accepts responsibility for the crimes. 
This reduces her offense level by two. [d. § 3E1.1, at 263. Ms. Kimura's total offense 
level is 27. 
67. [d. § 4A1.1, at 267. 
68. [d. at 288. 
69. The departure provisions introduce a common law approach into the guideline 
structure. The guidelines authorize departures in situations that present factors of a kind 
not considered by the Sentencing Commission when formulating the guidelines. 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988). 
The Commission anticipated that during the first five years district judges would 
depart more than they should. Stephen G. Breyer, Testimony at the United States Sen-
tencing Commission Hearings (Chicago, Illinois, Oct. 17, 1986). The guidelines contain 
language to the contrary. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 4, at 6 ("the Commission be-
lieves that despite the courts' legal freedom to depart from the guidelines, they will not 
do so very often."). In addition, the strict language of the guidelines and policy state-
12
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his reasons for departure using a framework that embraces the 
"universal model" outlined earlier.70 I propose a three-step ap-
proach, triggered by a threshold inq~iry. 
As a threshold issue, the sentencing judge should consider 
whether the defendant's race or cultural background was a sig-
nificant factor in the act. If so, the judge should focus first, on 
the offender's action, second, on the offender's culpability, and 
third, on the form(s) and severity of sanctions that would best 
serve the goals of sentencing as expressed by the offender's cul-
tural community. 
While focusing on the defendant's act, the court should in-
quire whether the offender's racial or cultural community has a 
unique perspective concerning the particular act. Next, the court 
should consider whether the offender's position or role within 
her particular community renders her less culpable, and if so, 
how much less. The judge should inquire into traditional roles 
within the offender's culture.71 Finally, if the offense warrants 
punishment, the sentencing judge should determine the appro-
priate form(s) and severity of punishment against the backdrop 
of the offender's racial or cultural community. 
There is little doubt that Ms. Kimura's race and cultural 
background were significant motivating factors in her act. Testi-
mony of members of Los Angeles' Japanese community should 
be sufficient to establish its consistency with her culture and the 
community's expectation of a woman in her situation. Ms. 
Kimura's culpability is directly related to her social role within 
ments, as well as media reports suggesting that the guidelines handcuffed judges, created 
an ambiance of inflexibility in the legal community. Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing 
in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 
101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1744-45 (1992). This "mixed message" has caused many district and 
appellate judges to overlook their "statutory duty to depart." [d. at 1744-46. 
The guidelines authorize two types of departures. The first kind of departure in-
volves instances where "the guidelines provide specific guidance for departure, by anal-
ogy or by other numerical or non-numerical suggestions." Guidelines Manual, supra 
note 4, at 6. The second type of departure is "unguided." [d.; see generally Bruce M. 
Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure Jurisprudence 
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1991). 
70. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. 
71. Hamilton & Sanders, supra note 58, at 209 ("Whether the unit is a family or a 
society (or something in between), its social organization is likely to affect its ways of 
righting wrongs and settling disputes. And all units have histories that can illuminate the 
how and why of their organizing principles."). 
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the cultural community and whether the community viewed her 
actions as conforming to that role. 
Ms. Kimura's culpability does not reach the level associated 
with voluntary manslaughter.72 When contrasted to American 
culture, social obligations are more important to actors within 
the Japanese culture.7S Japanese culture contains a hierarchy of 
roles, within which actors are influenced by community expecta-
tions.7• Thus, freedom of choice to act or not to act may be 
greatly diminished by the society's role-based expectations. Ms. 
Kimura's role was that of a wife and a mother. She had recently 
discovered that her husband was supporting a mistress. Her so-
cial obligation was to rid herself of shame without leaving that 
shame to haunt her children. Oyako-shinju, though perhaps 
more common in earlier times, was nevertheless within the realm 
of her community's expectations. Her culpability is not that of 
one convicted of voluntary manslaughter. She should not be in-
carcerated for seventy to eighty-seven months. 
If not seventy to eighty-seven months incarceration, how 
long? Her act and the level of culpability, viewed from the per-
spective of her cultural community, is analogous to involuntary 
manslaughter. 711 Applying the guidelines to involuntary man-
slaughter, her total offense level is twelve.76 The sentencing table 
suggests that the length of her sentence be from ten to sixteen 
months.77 Selecting a just form of punishment for Ms. Kimura is 
72. "Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice." Man-
slaughter is voluntary if it occurs "[u)pon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion." 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1112(a) (1988). 
73. Hamilton & Sanders, supra note 58, at 200. The basis for this difference appears 
to be the "ideology of individualism" which dominates American life and the group ide-
ology so evident in Japanese culture. [d. 
74. [d. at 208. 
75. Manslaughter is involuntary when it occurs "[i)n the commission of an unlawful 
act not amounting to a felony, or in the commission in an unlawful manner, or without 
due caution and circumspection, of a lawful act which might produce death." 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1112(a) (1979). Ms. Kimura's crime, I suggest, viewed from the perspective of her com-
munity, might best be described as a lawful act that produced death, committed without 
due caution and circumspection. 
76. Assuming that the sentencing judge finds Ms. Kimura's act to be criminally neg-
ligent rather than reckless, her base offenlje level is 10. GUIDELINES MANUAL. supra note 
4, § 2A1.4, at 36-37. Adjusting for the unusual vulnerability of the victims (+ 2 levels), 
the fact that there are two counts (+ 2 levels), and assuming that Ms. Kimura accepts 
responsibility (-2 levels), her total offense level is 12. [d. 
77. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 4, at 288. 
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more complex. Incarceration may not be appropriate.7s 
The United States and Japan are examples of divergent 
"moral cultures;"79 each seeks to accomplish distinct goals 
through criminal sanctions.so Though Ms. Kimura's act took 
place in the United States, her Japanese culture significantly in-
fluenced her actions. Because our society celebrates both cul-
tural pluralism and individualized justice, her sanctions, too, 
should be influenced by the goals and purposes expressed by her 
cultural community.s1 The sentencing judge should seek to re-
store the social bonds necessary for Ms. Kimura and her com-
munity to resume a positive relationship. 
In a pluralistic society, cases like Ms. Kimura's will not be 
the norm, nor will they be highly unusual. 'The sentencing guide-
lines should allow judges to depart using race as a mitigating 
factor where an offender's race is a significant factor in the 
crime. Issues concerning race were not unusual in state and fed-
eral courts before the Guidelines era. These issues involved 
other Asian societies,s2 Afro-Americans,s3 Hispanics,s, and 
78. In the actual case, Ms. Kimura pled no contest to two counts of voluntary man-
slaughter and faced a maximum sentence of thirteen years in state prison. However, Los 
Angeles County Superior Court Judge Robert W. Thomas sentenced her to one year in 
county jail and five years probation. Judge Thomas also ordered Ms. Kimura to undergo 
psychiatric treatment. The judge credited her with time served and Ms. Kimura was 
released from custody the day of sentencing. Mother Placed on Probation in 2 Drown-
ings, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1985, at 1. 
79. The United States is a "guilt" culture. Japan has a "shame" culture. Hamilton 
& Sanders, supra note 58, at 200, 208. In a guilt culture an "individual responds to 
internalized demands from the self, avoiding misdeeds because of their internalized psy-
chological costs." [d. at 200. On the other hand, an actor embedded in a shame culture 
"responds to the anticipated reaction of others, avoiding misdeeds because of their social 
ramifications. " [d. 
80. Generally, "guilt" cultures such as the United States focus on individual actors. 
Thus, the focus of criminal sanctions tends to be retributive. "Shame" cultures, on the 
other hand, focus on groups and the obligations of individuals within groups. The focus 
of criminal sanctions in societies that are shame oriented, like Japan, is restitutive. See 
supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
81. Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1293, 1299 
(1986)("Treating persons raised in a foreign culture differently should not be viewed as 
an exercise in favoritism, but rather as a vindication of the principles of fairness and 
equality that underlie a system of individualized justice."). 
82. See Sherman, supra note 64, at 26-27; Oliver, supra note 64; Dick Polman, After 
a Killer Eludes Jail, A "Cultural Defense" is on Trial, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, July 2, 
1989, Nat'l Section, at A01; and Katherine Bishop, Asian Tradition at War With Ameri-
can Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1988, A18. These articles describe the legal problems that 
Asian tribal people encounter in the United States. Following the Vietnam war, the 
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United States government relocated several groups of Asians to various sites within the 
United States. These groups have been reluctant to surrender their traditions. When the 
tribal traditions conflict with American laws, courts have difficulty resolving issues of 
culpability and sanctions. The Hmong tribe from Laos provides an excellent example. 
The Hmong's medicinal use of opium, ritual slaughtering of animals, and practice of zij 
poj niam are particularly troublesome to courts. 
Zij poj niam is a one of several traditional forms of marriage among the Hmong. 
Best translated as marriage-by-capture, this practice has led to several kidnapping and 
rape charges in California's San Joaquin Valley. Ms. Bishop describes traditional zij poj 
niam: 
Id. at col.2. 
Couples meet and carryon a courtship that often begins 
with a celebration of the New Year, and a ball tossing game 
for eligible young people. Eventually the young man "cap-
tures" the young woman in the presence of an older relative 
while the young woman ritually protests that she does not 
want to go with him. 
He takes her to his family home where she is met by rela-
tives for a brief ceremony at the door, and remains for three 
days in which the marriage is consummated and his relatives 
visit her family to pay a "bride price" for her. 
Tradition further complicates the dilemma for Hmong women. Often they do not 
challenge zij poj niam because "once a marriage has been consummated, no matter how 
it came about, a Hmong female is generally considered unmarriageable by other Hmong 
men." Sherman, supra note 64, at 27, col.l. 
Most of the cases involving zij poj niam have been resolved in juvenile courts. The 
one case that proceeded to a formal disposition involved a plea bargain. The judge ac-
cepted a plea whereby the court dropped kidnapping and rape charges and the defend-
ant pled guilty to false imprisonment. The judge sentenced the defendant to 90 days in 
jail. Id. 
Arriving at a just sanction involves additional serious problems. Traditional Asian 
people sentenced to jail for minor crimes have hanged themselves rather than face the 
disgrace that accompanies jail. I d. at col. I. 
83. See the brief description of United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972). In Alexander, Benjamin Murdock, an African-
American, was convicted of killing a white marine in a bar. After testimony from a psy-
chiatrist, Murdock's attorney sought to show that the defendant's "rotten social back-
ground" deprived him of the freedom not to act. Murdock's attorney asked the jury to 
"take the trip back through [the defendant's) lifetime" in the ghetto "and look at the 
effect that his lifetime had on him . . . and determine whether he could control himself 
or not." Id. at 959 n.l00. 
In his controversial book Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice, Silberman suggests 
that black crime, generally attributed by liberals to the poverty of the ghetto, is actually 
the result of a break down of cultural devices that controlled crime within the Afro-
American community. CHARLES E. SILBERMAN. CRIMINAL VIOLENCE. CRIMINAL JUSTICE. 135 
(1978). Mechanisms that enhanced self control under extreme provocation began to 
erode in the early 1960s, claims Silberman. The result has been a culturally-based rise in 
violence. Id. at 143-52. 
84. See United States v. Gomez, 797 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1986). Gomez involved an 
illegal alien from Columbia who was convicted of trafficking drugs. The Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled that statements by the prosecutor and the judge noting the de-
fendant's illegal alien status were not improper. The Court ruled the comments were not 
ethnic, but geographic in nature. Id. State v. Curbello-Rodriguez, 351 N.W.2d 758 (Wis. 
16
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Native Americans.811 Under the guidelines, federal courts con-
tinue to encounter issues concerning race when sentencing crimi-
nal defendants.86 The results have been less than satisfactory. 
Sentencing judges have sanctioned the Sentencing Commis-
sion's distorted representation of Congress' intent regarding the 
relevance of an offender's race, sex, and national origin.87 Con-
Ct. App. 1984) is an example from state court. At about midnight one summer evening, 
the victim, a young woman of 16 years, and a friend met Armando Garcia on Madison . 
Street in Madison, Wisconsin. The victim asked Garcia if she could borrow a dollar. 
Garcia stated that he did not have a dollar with him, and invited the young women to his 
apartment where' he promised to give them money. The young women accompanied Gar· 
cia to his apartment. There they met the defendant and two others, recent immigrants 
from Cuba. The two women spoke no Spanish. Garcia spoke English and Spanish. The 
others spoke no English. 
The two young women sat at the kitchen table and smoked marijuana with the men. 
When the women attempted to leave, the men locked the door and secured it with a 
chain. The victim was raped repeatedly by the defendant and his two companions. 
The court found the 25 year-old defendant guilty of three counts first degree sexual 
assault, six counts sexual assault as an aider and abetter, and one count abduction. The 
pre-sentence report recommended 20 to 25 years incarceration; he got 80 and appealed, 
among other things, the severity of the sentence. The court of appeals upheld the sen-
tence. Judge Bablitch wrote a concurring opinion, but disagreed with the trial court's 
sentence. 
Although powerless to do anything but "rubber stamp" a sentence so long as the 
trial court discussed certain discretionary factors, the length of the sentence left Judge 
Bablitch with a "sense of injustice ... deep and lingering." [d, at 770. She believed the 
defendant's culture was relevant, not to justify his acts, but in the sentencing decision. 
[d. 
After noting that the defendant had no previous record, Judge Bablitch reviewed his 
testimony. The defendant believed the young women to be "available" when they came 
to the apartment about midnight, looking for a dollar and some marijuana, and then 
stayed and talked to a group of men they did not know, whose language they did not 
share. "Perhaps, in his culture," she wrote, "such conduct at such an hour would be 
widely interpreted as an invitation to sexual games by willing players familiar with the 
possible consequences." [d. at 770. 
85. Tova Indritz, Testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee 
on Criminal Justice 239 (Denver, Colorado, November 5, 1986)(Ms. Indritz is the Chief 
Federal Public Defender in Albuquerque, New Mexico); Donna Chavez, Testimony 
before the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice 164 (Denver, 
Colorado, November 5, 1986)(at the time of her testimony Ms. Chavez was the Assistant 
Attorney General of the Navajo Nation). 
86. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Prestemon, 929 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 220 (1991); United States v. 
Lowden, 905 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 876 (1990); United States v. 
Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326 (8th Cir. 1990). 
87. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text; see also THOMAS W, HUTCHINSON 
& DAVID YELLEN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE 376 (1989). The authors label 
the Commission's policy statement concerning the relevance of race, sex, national origin, 
creed, and socioeconomic status as "too sweeping" considering the legislative history of 
the Sentencing Reform Act. [d.; Freed, supra note 69, at 1727. Freed, a pioneer in the 
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gress' intent was to arrest, at the sentencing stage, the operation 
of racism, sexism and other forms of bias.88 The guidelines mis-
state this intent. And if it were not for several highly discerning 
judges,89 federal courts would have barred completely the effects 
of race,90 gender,91 and national origin92 on highly relevant sen-
sentencing reform movement, views appellate courts' failure to address "whether tal 
guideline or policy statement is authorized by and consistent with the statute" as a fun-
damental impediment to the evolution of sentencing principles under the guidelines. [d. 
at 1731. 
88. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Gaviria, 
804 F. Supp. 476, 480 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). Gaviria involved a downward departure where 
the defendant's "status as a victim of systematic physical and emotional abuse substan-
tially lessen[edl her blameworthiness." [d. Maria Gaviria pled guilty to knowingly and 
intentionally possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. She faced a guideline sentence 
that included between 70 and 87 months incarceration. Judge Weinstein departed down-
ward to the statutory minimum of 60 months. In relating the all too familiar story of a 
Latin American woman victimized by a pattern of physical and psychological abuse, 
Judge Weinstein gave the § 5Hl.l0 policy statement its proper hue. 
Ms. Gaviria's early life in poverty-stricken Medellin, Columbia was "hand-to-
mouth." Her father had eighteen children. She was beaten and abused by her parents, 
relatives, babysitter, and, after her marriage at sixteen, her husband. The beatings and 
sexual abuse continued after Maria and her husband came to the United States to deal 
drugs. When she was arrested in Queens, New York, Maria knew no English, had no 
money, did not know how to travel, and was completely dependent on her husband, fear-
ing death at his hands if she didn't do exactly what he ordered. [d. at 477. 
Judge Weinstein recognized the syndrome and its prevalence in Latin cultures. [d. 
at 479-80. He indicated that 18 U.S.C. § 3661 required that a sentencing judge consider 
all available information about the defendant. Judge Weinstein then rejected a literal 
interpretation of § 5Hl.l0 as contrary to the Congressional directive contained in 18 
U.S.C. § 3661. He departed from the guideline range, refusing to "deny the effects of 
gender on relevant and appropriate sentencing criteria." Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. at 480. 
89. United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.)(holding that a defendant's sta-
tus as an alien may be relevant in extraordinary cases), cert. denied, ll4 S.Ct. 405 
(1993); United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326 (8th Cir. 1990)(majority opinion of 
Judge Heaney affirming a downward departure based, in part, on a Native American 
defendant's persistent efforts to overcome adverse conditions on the Pine Ridge Reserva-
tion); United States v. Handy, 752 F. Supp. 561 (E.D.N.Y. 1990)(opinion of Judge Glas-
ser departing downward in light of the exceptionally promising future of defendant's 
children, despite the fact that family ties and responsibilities are "not ordinarily rele-
vant" under § 5H1.6 of the guidelines). See also United States v. Yu, 954 F.2d 951 (3d 
Cir. 1992)(dissenting opinion of Judge Becker maintaining that cultural differences could 
justify a downward departure), cert. denied, ll3 S. Ct. 964 (1993); Olabisi L. Clinton, 
Cultural Differences and Sentencing Departures, 5 FED. SENT. R. 348 (discussing the 
decision of Judge William A. Ingram in United States v. Saeturn, No. 90-20085 (N.D. 
Cal. 1992)). 
90. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Prestemon, 929 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Desormeaux, 952 F.2d 182 
(8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Lowden, 905 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1990) 
91. See, e.g., United States v. Restrepo, 936 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Natal-Rivera, 879 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1989). 
92. See, e.g., United States v. Yu, 954 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. 
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tencing criteria.93 A sentencing judge's consideration of an of-
fender's race may be entirely consistent with Congress' intent. It 
is not racist, for example, to consider the effects of an offender's 
race in the case of a bi-racial twenty-one year-old male, an honor 
student, adopted by a white family at three months, convicted 
as a first-time offender of armed robbery for holding up a bank 
with a BB gun.94 That's not racism. To the contrary, when the 
system prohibits sentencing judges from considering race and 
other factors in appropriate cases, we unleash a warped sense of 
justice.91i 
Natal-Rivera, 879 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Rasag, 1 Fed. Sent. R. 200 
(D. Nev 1988). 
93. Judges are struggling to develop a notion of when consideration of socioeco-
nomic status is appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. Genao, 831 F. Supp. 246 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); United States v. Valdez-Gonzalez, 957 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
Compare United States v. Hatchett, 923 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1991), remanded, 765 F. 
Supp 349 (W.D. Tex.), a!f'd without op., United States v. Soto, 952 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 
1992). In Hatchett, District Court Judge Nowlin refused the defendant's request for a 
downward departure because Hatchett had not availed himself of "many advantages ... 
[such as) ... the opportunity to ... acquire an education." Judge Nowlin explained 
that "folks who have had the advantages and ... still don't conform their conduct to 
the law are going to be punished perhaps to a greater extent in this court .... " [d. at 
372. But see United States v. Hatchett, 741 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Tex. 1990), a!f'd in part 
and vacated in part, 923 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1991)(a sua sponte decision supplementing 
the sentencing record in which Judge Nowlin defends his remarks as "lectur[ing)."). [d. 
at 623. 
See also United States v. Onwuemene, 933 F.2d 650 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Rodriguez, 882 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir. 1989). In Onwuemene, Judge Heaney vacated the 
defendant's sentence and remanded the decision after the sentencing judge commented 
that "[t)his country was good enough to allow you to come in here and confer upon you 
... benefits ... and ... opportunities ... [w)e have got enough criminals ... without 
importing any." Onwuemene, 933 F.2d at 651. In Rodriguez, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed an upward departure based on numerous factors. However, the court 
. indicated that two of the factors articulated by the district court were impermissibly 
considered. Rodriguez, 882 F.2d at 652. The district court had commented that the de-
fendant's status as an immigrant burdened him with a "special duty" to become a "pro-
ductive member of society" and to learn English. [d. at 1066. The Court of Appeals ruled 
consideration of these factors improper. [d. 
94. See United States v. Prestemon, 929 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1991). Nor is it sexist 
for a sentencing judge to account for gender in the case of a 36 year-old women, a first-
time offender, who grew up in "a socio-economic minefield," and as a single parent suc-
cessfully raised three children without public assistance, when she succumbed to the 
wishes of her boyfriend to accompany him to New York City to buy narcotics and they 
were arrested by undercover agents. See United States v. Handy, 752 F. Supp. 561 
(E.D.N.Y. 1990). 
95. See, e.g., United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326 (8th Cir. 1990)(Wollman, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). David Big Crow was convicted of assault with a 
dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury resulting from an inci-
dent involving several companions and a night of heavy drinking on the Pine Ridge Res-
19
Gomez: Race As a Sentencing Factor
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
376 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:357 
In particular, cases involving Native Americans present im-
mediate problems for federal courts.96 Federal Courts have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over Indians charged with committing major 
crimes within reservations.97 Traditionally, federal judges have 
used the sentencing process to consider if the relevant cultural 
differences of Indian offenders were a mitigating factor.98 The 
sentencing judge, in effect, "bridge[s] the gap between two dis-
tinct and different cultures. "99 The intent of the federal guide-
lines is to reduce the disparity generated by this type of judicial 
intervention. Yet, it is in the arena of sentencing Native Ameri-
can offenders that attorneys and commentators can mount the 
strongest challenge to the race-neutral notions of the federal 
ervation. The government appealed a downward departure from a guideline range of 37-
46 months to a sentence of 24 months imprisonment. The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed. However, Judge Wollman dissented, stating that § 5H1.10 precluded departure 
in this case. This, despite the fact that Judge Wollman considered Big Crow's sentence 
fair. "[A)s an abstract matter I have no disagreement with the sentence imposed by the 
district court. . . some things. . . are better left alone, and Big Crow's sentence is one 
of them." [d. at 1332-33. He concluded that courts "should not approve departures that, 
however appealing they may be in their result, subvert ... [the) goal [of eliminating 
unwarranted disparity) and the spirit of the Guidelines." [d. 
96. Letter from Fredric F. Kay, Federal Public Defender, District of Arizona to The , 
Honorable William W. Wilkins, Chairman, The United States Sentencing Commission 
(Aug. 9, 1989)(on file with author); letter from The Honorable Richard M. Bilby, Chief 
Judge, United States District Court, District of Arizona to The Honorable William W. 
Wilkins, Chairman, The United States Sentencing Commission (Aug. 12, 1989)(on file 
with author). According to Mr. Kay, a disproportionate number of federal crimes, espe-
cially violent crimes, involve Indians. Mr. Kay's letter urges the Commission to be "sen-
sitive to the unique problems on the reservations." Judge Bilby's letter stresses the 
"need to revisit the question of alcoholism on the reservations and the impact on the 
guidelines. " 
See also letter from The Honorable William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman, The United 
States Sentencing Commission to The Honorable Richard M. Bilby, Chief Judge, United 
States District Court, District of Arizona (Aug. 30, 1989)(on file with author). Judge Wil-
kins informed Judge Bilby that the Commission rejected alcoholism as a mitigating fac-
tor after extensive debate and consideration. Judge Wilkins also related that the Com-
mission was "not unmindful" of the number of violent offenses committed on Indian 
Reservations. However, Judge Wilkins wrote, "the Commission concluded that it would 
be contrary to our statutory mandate to draft guidelines which set forth two separate 
standards of justice - one for American Indians and another for everyone else." 
97. Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § ll53 (1988). The "major crimes" include 
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, incest, various crimes involving assault, arson, bur-
glary, and robbery. [d. 
98. Donna Chavez, Testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 
85, at 178. 
99. C.F. Tallis, Sentencing in the North, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN SENTENCING 306 
(Grosman ed. 1980)(commenting on Canadian judges in Canada's Northern Territories). 
Federal judges, especially in the Southwest, appear to play the same role. See generally 
Donna Chavez, Testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 85. 
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guidelines. loo 
Both the Indian tribes and the government intended the 
reservation system to be separatist. lOI In many respects the rela-
tionship between tribal and the American legal systems reflect 
the notion of separatism. For example, despite the clear inten-
tion of the Indian Major Crimes Act to bring all major crimes 
into federal court, there is still a strong interest in allowing 
tribes to control their own dispute resolution mechanisms. l02 
The concept of separatism is well founded; treaty negotia-
tors for both sides recognized each other's "radically different 
world views."103 Generally, whites and Indians still maintain re-
alities that are worlds apart. l04 The differences in world views 
are reflected in the divergent legal systems. 1011 Yet the American 
100. Indian defendants need not attack § 5H1.10 to argue for disparate treatment 
at the sentencing stage. A downward departure could be based upon a Native American's 
political status. See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1976); Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-53 & n.24 (1974). Congress has sanctioned disparate treat-
ment of Native Americans based on political status and culture. See, e.g., Indian Child 
Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 .. 
101. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME. AND THE LAW, NATIVE SOCIE-
TIES IN A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 14-16 (1987). 
102. Id. at 120. 
103. Id. at 15. 
104. Robert A. Williams Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of 
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WISC. L. 
REV. 219, 293 (1986). 
105. See generally Donna Chavez, Testimony before the Committee on the Judici-
ary, supra note 85. Tribal legal systems vary among individual tribes. However, many 
tribal legal systems resemble Professor Griffiths' "family model." See generally Griffiths, 
supra note 59. In a family, sanctions involve more than punishment, deterrence, protec-
tion, and rehabilitation. "[A]ny process between [a parent and a child] will reflect the 
full range of their relationship and the concerns growing out of it." Id. at 373. 
As within a family, the ultimate goal of sanctions within many tribal systems is a 
reconcilability of interests between the tribal community and the offender. See Id. at 
373, 387 n.99. Tribal sanctions, unlike many of the sanctions meted out in state and 
federal courts that seek to exile the offender, id. at 378, contemplate a continuing rela-
tionship. See generally Donna Chavez, Testimony before the Committee on the Judici-
ary, supra note 85; Tova Indritz, Testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary, 
supra note 85; Michael Katz, Testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary, Sub-
committee on Criminal Justice (Denver, Colorado, November 5, 1986)(Mr. Katz is a Fed-
eral Public Defender in Denver, Colorado). In fact, the imposition of tribal sanctions 
often involves local community input. Donna Chavez, Testimony before the Committee 
on the Judiciary, supra note 85, at 165. 
Tribal systems embrace additional features that distinguish them from the Ameri-
can criminal justice system and, at the same time, cause them to resemble Professor 
Griffiths' model. For example, the model American criminal process is compartmental-
ized into distinct phases. See Griffiths, supra note 59, at 376. The arrest, trial, and sen-
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legal system readily takes tribal disputes from the reservation 
and places them on the desks of federal judges. 
Fragmentary evidence suggests that, prior to the sentencing 
guidelines, federal judges performed their function well. loa In 
cases involving Navajo offenders not only federal judges, but 
also some prosecutors and public defenders have developed a 
unique sensitivity to the Navajo sense of justice. l07 The federal 
sentences of Navajo offenders reflect this sensitivity.l08 The fed-
eral sentencing guidelines threaten the development of this deli-
cate balance. 
Because the guidelines require sentencing judges to be neu-
tral with regard to race,109 sentencing judges are less likely to 
consider the unique circumstances that surround sentencing an 
Indian offender. Nevertheless, the sentencing guidelines' depar-
ture provisions provide an avenue for federal judges when justice 
requires that they bridge the gap between cultures. 
tencing phases each have different functions and different rules. The family model lacks 
this "conceptual compartmentalization." [d. Likewise, "traditional Navajo people do not 
necessarily break their perception of justice into discrete phases of the criminal process 
which would allow the separation of the idea of sentencing from accusatory and trial 
phases." Donna Chavez, Testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 
85, at 165. 
Language and other customs provide additional evidence of how tribal legal systems 
reflect the different world views of many Indian tribes. For example, the concept of 
"guilty" cannot be expressed in the Eskimo language. W.G. Morrow, Administration of 
Justice and Native People, Symposium on the Law and Native People, 38 SASKATCHE-
WAN L. REV. 16, 20. Also, the Innuit and Indian cultures in Canada's Northwest Territo-
ries did not have jails. Tallis, supra note 99, at 305. 
106. Donna Chavez, Testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 
85, at 178. 
107. [d. at 164; see also Tova Indritz, Testimony before the Committee on the Judi-
ciary, supra note 85; Michael Katz, Testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary, 
supra note 105. 
108. Donna Chavez, Testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 
85; Tova Indritz, Testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 85. Both 
Ms. Chavez and Ms. Indritz testified concerning what they called "cultural restitution." 
Ms. Indritz best described the concept: 
[d. at 240. 
[T]he tribe will, sometimes through the tribal courts, or some-
times not, have arranged sort of a mediated settlement be-
tween families, ,and the victim's family says, "We don't want 
this guy to go to prison" .... I had a case last fall where my 
client was charged with killing his uncle, and the family all got 
together and said, "You know, we lost one person. It was 
partly his fault, and we don't want this kid to go to jail." 
109. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. 
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The departure provisions of the federal sentencing guide-
lines are destined to be much litigated.110 Their limits are still 
undefinedlll and provide fertile grounds for effective lawyering 
skills. Arguing that race or ethnic culture is a basis for departure 
certainly pushes those limits. Yet, especially in prosecutions of 
Indians, the departure provisions appear to provide a passage to 
justice.1l2 
110. See supra note 69. 
111. See generally Selya & Kipp, supra note 69. 
112. In fact, the Commissioners discussed using the departure provisions in cases 
involving Indian offenders. Tova Indritz, Testimony before the Committee on the Judici-
ary, supra note 85, at 240-42. But the Commissioners didn't appear to agree on how 
sentencing judges should use the departure provisions: 
[d. 
MS. INDRITZ: (after describing an incident where a family 
agreed upon a unique arrangement regarding a murder) [We 
need) . . . more opportunity for discretion on the part of the 
trial judges, who really are the only ones who can take into 
account the particular facts which may seem unusual or may 
not be so unusual. 
COMMISSIONER BREYER: Well, you have something un-
usual to the country as a whole, but nonetheless of the partic-
ular community it may be premeditated crimes are less com-
mon and provoked more common, even though it's unusual in 
that community, in which case we don't have to write a guide-
line I wouldn't think!.) that governs all kinds of family rela-
tionships which may be common in some parts of the world, 
and not in others. 
MS. INDRITZ: I think that's the reason there should be more 
room for discretion. 
COMMISSIONER BREYER: Depart. 
CHAIRMAN WILKINS: Allow for departure, brother against 
brother, friend against friend, acquaintance against acquain-
tance, drinking buddies against drinking buddies. I mean it's a 
whole group of cases you are talking about. But they have to 
know, "Judge, this is not something we wrote guidelines for." 
It has to be more than that. 
COMMISSIONER BREYER: Well, the thing to do is to write 
a departure policy, and you could look at that and try to figure 
out what other things ought to be in there. 
That's possible. I mean you could have an escape clause, 
you know, and say, "We haven't thought of everything," and 
time will - time and monitoring and appellate court decisions 
and just looking and seeing what happens that will identify it 
for us. 
But see letter from The Honorable William W. Wilkins, Jr., to The Honorable Rich-
ard M. Bilby, Chief Judge, (on file with author)(suggesting that the Commission had 
considered the problems on Indian reservations). Whether it has done so adequately is 
another issue. 
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III. CASES TAINTED BY RACIAL BIAS 
Sentencing judges using the federal guidelines need not be 
racially neutral in the class of cases where racial bias has pro-
vided an inaccurate picture of either the defendant's case or the 
defendant's criminal history. 
Racism is still epidemic in our society;1l3 it is reflected 
throughout the criminal justice system, from the decision to re-
port criminal activity until the parole decision, and beyond.1l4 
Sentencing judges should consider race a mitigating factor and 
depart from the range specified by the sentencing guidelines in 
two additional situations: first, where it is likely that racial dis-
crimination has occurred at previous stages of the criminal pro-
cess; and second, where racial bias has made it likely that the 
defendant's criminal history improperly magnifies the serious-
ness of his crime or the likelihood that he will commit future 
ones. 
At the final stages of the criminal process, race neutrality 
could petrify, and may even amplify the effects of discrimination 
that have occurred at earlier stages in the process. The bias be-
gins, even before the decision to arrest, with the allocation and 
distribution of law enforcement resources. lUi Law enforcement 
agencies often "direct their attention to only a limited range of 
113. See, e.g., Race: Our Dilemma Still, NEWSWEEK. May 11, 1992, at 44. 
114. See generally MARC MAUER. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK MEN AND 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A GROWING NATIONAL PROBLEM (1990); AMERICAN BAR As· 
SOCIATION. THE STATE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AN ANNUAL REPORT (1993) [hereinafter 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANNUAL REPORT]; Developments in the Law - Race and the 
Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1473 (1988). I leap over a major cause of racial bias 
in the criminal justice system, the description of criminal activity itself. See DONALD J. 
BLACK. THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE 22-23 (1980). Generally, our society is 
quick to classify fringe activities of racial minorities as criminal. At times, "the mere fact 
of an act's unconventionality, by itself, attracts legal repression. . . ." I d. at 23; see also 
MAUER, supra, at 6; Kleck, supra note 11, at 784. 
115. Heaney, supra note 47, at 774. I do not discuss how racial bias effects what 
criminal activity the public reports to the police. Ordinary citizens act as the first screen-
ing devices by calling or writing the police with information. Also, "[t]he degree of police 
concern with vice of various kinds ... reflects the demands of the hirger public, as ex-
pressed in newspaper stories and editorials, statements and protests by organizations, 
and pressures brought to bear upon politicians who have the capacity to influence police 
administrators." BLACK, supra note 114, at 18 n.14. Racial bias affects both types of pub-
lic input. 
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the conduct that outwardly qualifies as vice. "118 Often that range 
includes the acts of minorities while excluding those same acts 
when the actors are "social elites."117 Even the most common 
crimes "attract the most law when they occur in a larger context 
of unconventionality. "118 
Individual police officers augment the bias already estab-
lished by law enforcement agencies. By unconscious decisions in-
volving what crimes to investigate and on-the-spot decisions in-
volving who is arrested for what act, officers walking the beat 
contribute to the systematic racism. Departments give individ-
ual officers latitude to decide which crimes to investigate.119 
Often, the officer's decision is not racially neutral;120 rarely is it 
reviewable.121 While little data exists about the relevant factors 
in individual officers' choice to investigate a specific crime, stud-
ies indicate that race is a significant factor in the decision to 
116. BLACK, supra note 114, at 23. There is no better example than the one Black 
supplies: 
[d. 
117. [d. 
In the case of narcotics enforcement, for instance, [law en-
forcement agencies) show little or no interest in the use of il-
licit drugs by people who are in other respects conventional in 
lifestyle. Thus, although physicians as a group have an excep-
tionally high rate of opiate addiction, the police do not de-
velop informers within the medical profession. Furthermore, 
even when they learn of a physician who is an addict, they 
rarely make an arrest or subject the individual to other indig-
nities that "street addicts" so often experience. 
118. [d. Black suggests that crimes such as prostitution, homosexuality, gambling, 
and after hours drinking are considered recreational for one class of people and illegal 
for others. [d. 
119. [d. at 10. This is true not only of patrol officers during the time that they are 
not actually responding to calls from the public, but also of detectives whose major re-
sponsibility is to investigate criminal action that patrol officers have brought to their 
attention. [d. at 14-15. 
120. Dannefer & Schutt, supra note 15, at 1123. In fact, race may be the most im-
portant factor in police dispositions. [d. See also Don Jackson, Police Embody Racism to 
My People, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1989, at A25. Mr. Jackson, an Afro-American police 
officer took a leave from the Hawthorne California Police Department in Hawthorne, 
California to investigate reports of police racism. On January 14, 1989, officer Jackson 
was stopped by white police officers from the Long Beach Police Department. The of-
ficers arrested Jackson and in the process shoved his head through a window. The inci-
dent was filmed by reporters from KNBC-TV who were following Jackson in an un-
marked van. Jackson calls police "the most prominent reminder" of the Black 
American's "second-class citizenship." [d. 
121. RESEARCH ON SENTENCING, supra note 5, at 42. 
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arrest.122 The data does not conclusively show racial bias, but 
police continue to arrest minorities at a higher rate than non-
minorities.123 Discrimination appears particularly acute if the of-
fender is a juvenile.124 
The bias continues throughout th~ process. Race influences 
the decision whether and how to charge someone who has been 
arrested.l2I! It influences the way the prosecutor maneuvers her 
forces, the way jurors evaluate the defendant's version, what 
eye-witnesses saw, and the community's reaction to the crime. 
By the time minority offenders reach the sentencing stage they 
"face more serious charges, [are] more often induced to plead 
guilty, [are] less able to make bail and thus organize a successful 
defense, and have restricted access to good legal representa-
tion."126 This stage by stage discrimination cumulates: minority 
offenders receive generally more severe sentences than others.127 
122. PETERSILIA, supra note 34, at 1; BLACK, supra note 114, at 95. 
123. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 9-10. Black 
suggests that the reason why blacks are arrested at a higher rate than whites is not due 
to discrimination but rather is a "function of the relatively higher rate at which black 
suspects display disrespect toward the police." BLACK, supra note 114, at 95. Of course, 
perceptions of disrespect may not be racially neutral. In a postscript written ten years 
later, Black discusses studies showing "that the police are more likely to give traffic tick-
ets to blacks ... more likely to arrest blacks under conditions later viewed as inadequate 
to justify prosecution ... more likely to use penal and coercive tactics when they handle 
disputes involving blacks ... and more likely to shoot and kill blacks." [d. at 107. 
There is no discrimination on the basis of race if blacks and other minorities are 
arrested at greater rates because they commit more crimes. Generally, studies focusing 
on self-reported crimes indicate that "nonwhites and lower-class persons are not really 
more delinquent but are just more likely to be arrested." Paul E. Tracy Jr., Race and 
Class Differences in Official and Self-Reported Delinquency in FROM Boy TO MAN. FROM 
DELINQUENCY TO CRIME 87, 118. However, a study by Mr. Tracy did not duplicate these 
findings. [d. at 119. 
124. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 11-12; PETER-
SILl A & TURNER. supra note 12, at 26. "Minority youths are more likely to be arrested 
and formally prosecuted than whites, who are more likely to be released to their parents' 
custody." [d. See also BLACK, supra note 96. Black reports that police officers tend to be 
"moralistic" with juvenile offenders, "frequently lecturing them about their misconduct 
and seeking to show them the selfishness and foolishness of their behavior." [d. at 25. 
Not surprisingly, police tend to be moralistic with juveniles whose racial background is 
similar to their own. "There is some evidence, for instance, that white officers are more 
moralistic toward white juveniles than toward black juveniles, though their formal dispo-
sitions of blacks may be more severe." [d. at 25 n.19. 
125. PETERSILIA. supra note 34, at 19, 89. 
126. [d. at 19. 
127. Liska & Tausig, supra note 57, at 199. For example, the sentences of minority 
defendants are more likely to include imprisonment. See, e.g., Stephen Klein et aI., Race 
and Imprisonment Decisions in California, 247 SCIENCE 812 (1990). Klein and his col-
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And, the existence of a prior record is a red flag should the of-
fender ever again come before a sentencing judge. Most judges 
believe that an offender with a prior record is "a different kind 
of a person . . . either incorrigible or an habitual criminal . . . ; 
[i]n either case ... thought to merit more severe treatment."128 
It is as though the criminal justice system places minority of-
fenders on a separate "track." And, the more contact they have 
with the system, the more difficult it is to escape. A Navajo In-
dian describes the path: 
There are alcohol related problems leading 
straight into the jails and from the jails into the 
court system; and from the court system into the 
Big Slammer, into the State Penitentiary of New 
Mexico. 129 
The Federal Sentencing Commission undertook "to enhance 
the ability of the criminal justice system to reduce crime 
through an effective, fair sentencing system."130 Eliminating race 
as a factor, they believed, would help realize that goal.l3l But, 
leagues report that, despite California's Determinate Sentencing Act, Latinos convicted 
of drug crimes are more likely to be sentenced to imprisonment. [d. at 816. 
128. WHEELER ET AL., supra note 25, at 13-14. See also Marjorie S. Zatz, Race, 
Ethnicity, and Determinate Sentencing, 22 CRIMINOLOGY 147 (1984). Ms. Zatz con-
ducted a study of almost five thousand sentences handed out during the first year of 
determinate sentences in California. She found that the effect of a prior record on the 
length of sentence differed significantly among racial groups. For example, the effect of 
two prior prison commitments was significantly harsher on Chicanos that either Whites 
or Blacks. [d. at 163. 
129. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NEW MEXICO ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE. THE FARMINGTON REPORT: A CONFLICT OF CULTURES 51 (1975). 
130. Federal Sentencing Commission, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
(1987), at 1.2. Apparently the Commission initially misread Congress' basic purpose for 
enacting the Sentencing Reform Act in 1984. A subsequent amendment makes it clear 
that by embarking on sentencing reform, Congress' objective was not to reduce crime, 
but rather to "combat crime." Federal Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual (1991), at 512, amend. 307 (emphasis added). 
131. See Symposium: Equality Versus Discretion in Sentencing, supra note 2. At 
the symposium, Commissioner Ilene Nagel commented on pre-guideline sentencing 
decisions: 
[S)ome district court judges systematically treated [B)lacks 
and [H)ispanics more harshly while others used the court to 
promote a system of alleged justice, where minorities were 
given light sentences as an accommodation to past societal 
wrongs ... Race, sex, and social class of the offender, rather 
than being neutral and irrelevant to sentence determinations, 
exacerbated or mitigated the levels of punishment, in no con-
sistent way, and for no justifiable reasons. 
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the guidelines fail. 
The guidelines fail because the Commission views sentenc-
ing as a compartmentalized procedure that terminates the crimi-
nal process, not as a phase dependent on the other stages of the 
process, from arrest to parole. Compartmentalization, a useful 
aid in managing the complexities of the criminal process,132 can 
blind us to the cumulative effects of bias. If we continue to limit 
the information that a judge is permitted to use without re-ar-
ranging other aspects of the procedure we risk compromising the 
administration of justice. Sentencing reformers argued that 
many judges use extra-legal factors such as race inappropri-
ately.133 Therefore, the reformers adopted rules and guidelines 
to require judges to be neutral with regard to race and other 
extra-legal factors. 
However, neutrality at the sentencing phase may be 
counterproductive. l34 If a judge is uncompromisingly racially 
neutral at the sentencing stage she freezes in place any previous 
negative discrimination that has already taken place. Sentencing 
judges should not ignore this discrimination, but rather confront 
it and do what they can to compensate for it.l3II Judges must use 
[d. at 1815-16. But see Heaney, supra note 47. Judge Heaney compared judicial sen-
tencing disparity before and after the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Disparity existed 
before the guidelines, "but. . . 'its occurrence was infrequent, happenstantial, and idio-
syncratic.''' The guidelines, on the other hand, have "produced sentence disparities, 
which ... are 'regular [and) predictable ... .''' [d. at 774 (quoting Chief Judge G. 
Thomas Eisle, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas). See 
also Gerald w. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 188-89, n.64, 65 (1991). 
132. Minow, supra note I, at 34. See also Steven Koh, Note, Reestablishing the 
Federal Judge's Role in Sentencing, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1109 (1992). Koh argues that a 
major obstacle to the success of the pre-guideline system was a failure of the various 
actors to communicate among themselves. "The various actors, each with a particular 
informed perspective," were encouraged, on behalf of a system of individualized justice, 
to check, and balance the positions of other actors with his own. However, lack of com-
munication among the actors led to a process dominated by second-guessing and, as a 
result, unwarranted disparity. [d. at 1114-15. 
133. See supra notes 12 & 131 and accompanying text. 
134. Minow, supra note I, at 70. "[T)he state has chosen to preserve existing insti-
tutional arrangements that benefit some rather than others; doing nothing, or authoriz-
ing employers, juries, and other decision makers to do nothing, is no less of a choice." [d. 
at 70 n.278. 
135. Rose M. Ochi, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing, 24 THE JUDGES' 
J. 6, 54 (1985). Traditionally, judges have used the sentencing process to compensate for 
racial bias that occurred at earlier stages in the criminal procedure. Dannefer & Schutt, 
supra note IS, at 1129. 
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their unique position within the criminal justice system, gather-
ing and considering all information germane to just and fair 
punishment. 136 
There are basically two types of cases where racial bias may 
have provided the sentencing judge with an inaccurate portrait 
of the defendant. The judge should treat both similarly. The 
first type is where racial bias has occurred in previous stages of 
the defendant's case. Upon an initial showing that racial bias 
affected previous stages in the criminal process,137 the sentenc-
ing judge should determine whether the case would take on a 
different posture had there been no racial discrimination. If the 
judge's answer is yes, she should then depart downward from the 
otherwise applicable guideline range. 
The second type of case concerns situations where racial 
bias has made it likely that the defendant's criminal history cat-
egory significantly over-represents the seriousness of a defend-
ant's criminal history or the likelihood that he or she will com-
mit further crimes.13s The sentencing judge should consider each 
entry in the defendant's criminal history and determine (1) 
whether reliable information indicates that racial bias influenced 
the entry, and (2) whether the entry contributes to an over-rep-
resentation of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the like-
lihood that the defendant will commit other crimes. The sen-
tencing judge should use this information to guide her 
136. Traditionally, a sentencing judge's access to information was unlimited. See 
supra note 56. 
137. The proposed Fairness in Death Sentencing Act of 1991 provides a model sys-
tem of inferences, burdens, etc., that a judge may use upon an initial showing of racial 
bias. H.R. 2851, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See also Ronald J. Tabak, Is Racism Irrele-
vant? Or Should the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act be Enacted to Substantially 
Diminish Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing?, 18 REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 777 
(1990-91). Tabak reviews the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act and comments on the 
adequacy of its procedural elements. Id. 
138. The guidelines provide some guidance. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra, note 4, 
§ 4A1.3, at 277. Section 4A1.3, Adequacy of Criminal History Category, is a policy state-
ment that authorizes sentencing judges to depart from the otherwise applicable guideline 
range when "reliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not 
adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likeli-
hood that the defendant will commit other crimes." GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 4, 
at 277. This includes "cases where the court concludes that a defendant's criminal his-
tory category significantly over-represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal 
history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit further crimes." GUIDELINES 
MANUAL, supra note 4, at 278. 
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departure. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite the laudable objective of limiting discretion and as-
suring neutral treatment, the federal sentencing guidelines may 
at times create unfairness. They destroy two traditional roles of 
sentencing judges - bridging cultural gaps and compensating for 
prior racial bias - leaving a vacuum where previously at least 
some judges were able to impose just and fair sentences. Until 
modifications respond to this quandary, only a broad and uncon-
ventional view of the departure provisions can begin to address 
the dilemma that confronts many minority defendants - the di-
lemma of difference. 
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